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Sinking Nations and  
Climate Change Adaptation Strategies 
Ryan Jarvis 
This is a matter of life and death. The science is clear. Carbon 
concentrations higher than 350 parts per million, and temperature 
rises above 1.5 degrees, will submerge my country, dissolve our 
coral reefs, turn our oceans to acid, and destabilize the planet’s 
climate. 
    Mohamed Nasheed, President of the Maldives 
  Address at the COP 15 in Copenhagen, December 17, 20091 
I. INTRODUCTION     
The significant effects of climate change, particularly rising sea levels, 
are making the lives of some of the world’s most vulnerable populations 
extremely difficult. In 2009, inhabitants of the Carteret Islands, Papua New 
Guinea, gained international headlines for becoming some of the first 
“climate change refugees.”2 The small, picturesque island was inundated 
with water during the annual king tide season.3 Inhabitants were forced to 
stash their possessions in fishing nets and string them up between palm 
trees.4 Many inhabitants of the small islands have agreed to relocate, and the 
head of the relocation plan is trying to raise $1.5 million to fund the 
migration of 750 people before the annual king tides return in 2010.5 
Developed nations are feeling the effects of climate change as well. In 
2008, Kivalina, Alaska, an Inupiat Eskimo village, filed state and federal 
nuisance claims in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of 
California against various oil companies and electric utilities that have 
directly emitted large quantities of greenhouse gases for many years.6 The 
complaint provides that 
[g]lobal warming is destroying Kivalina through the melting of 
Arctic sea ice that formerly protected the village from winter 
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storms. The result of the increased storm damage is a massive 
erosion problem. Houses and buildings are in imminent danger of 
falling into the sea as the village is battered by storms and its 
ground crumbles from underneath it. Critical infrastructure is 
imminently threatened with permanent destruction. If the entire 
village is not relocated soon, the village will be destroyed.7 
Kivalina is seeking the estimated $95 million to $400 million necessary 
to relocate the entire island village to mainland Alaska.8 The case was 
dismissed by the district court9 and is currently on appeal in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.10 
It is true that some areas of the world are enjoying the benefits associated 
with a modest increase in temperatures. For example, higher latitude areas, 
such as regions in Canada, Russia, and Scandinavia, are benefitting from 
rising temperatures through higher agricultural yields, lower winter 
mortality, lower heating requirements, and a potential boost in tourism.11 
However, the effects of climate change are estimated to far outweigh the 
minimal benefits enjoyed by these few areas of the world. The cost of 
extreme weather events alone is estimated to lower global gross domestic 
product (GDP) by 0.5–1 percent by midcentury, and a raise in global 
temperatures of 5°C–6°C could result in a decrease in global GDP of 5–10 
percent, with developing nations suffering a decrease in GDP of over 10 
percent.12 In addition to more extreme weather, estimates are that sea levels 
could rise as much as two meters within the century.13 This slow and 
destructive rise in sea levels has been described as a global Hurricane 
Katrina in slow motion14 and could prove disastrous for small island 
nations, some of which rise no more than two meters from the sea. 
The Carteret Islands and Kivalina village climate-change-forced 
relocations are just two examples of what might occur in island nations 
throughout the world. The problems associated with relocation will be 
magnified as larger islands and entire nations are forced to leave their 
homes in search of dry, habitable land. These Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) are extremely vulnerable to climate change. Because many 
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SIDS rise no more than a few meters above sea level and are isolated in the 
world’s oceans, their human and ecological adaptive capacity is very low.15 
With the continued sea level rise rendering their island homes 
uninhabitable, some SIDS will be required to abandon their homelands and 
relocate their entire populations. 
While the international community has recognized the unique and severe 
risks climate change poses to SIDS, international law has failed to 
adequately address the issue. Although climate change mitigation efforts are 
underway, many SIDS are faced with such imminent and severe problems 
(i.e., the surrender of their homeland to rising seas) that mitigation will not 
solve the problem. Because of the developed world’s significant 
contribution to climate change, an international climate change adaptation 
regime supported by the developed world must be implemented to help 
SIDS adapt to climate change. 
First, I will briefly present the science of climate change and its unique 
threat to SIDS. Second, I will discuss politics of climate change, focusing 
on the world community’s failure to adequately address the problem and 
SIDS’ attempts to force action. Third, I will provide methods in which the 
world community can assist SIDS in dealing with imminent threats posed 
by climate change. In this third section, I will briefly discuss the inadequacy 
of mitigation measures for dealing with the climate change problems facing 
SIDS. I will then present and compare two adaptation strategies and their 
implementation, focusing on the difficult legal and political issues they 
raise. 
The first adaptation strategy I will discuss is a global immigration 
strategy under which an entire population of a particular SIDS would 
immigrate to other countries. The second adaptation strategy, supported by 
the President of the Maldives, is to purchase land from another country in 
order to completely relocate a country.16 Under this second strategy, a SIDS 
would remain a sovereign nation, just in another location. Both options pose 
significant legal and political problems, some of which have never been 
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addressed before; however, the lack of action by the world community has 
forced SIDS to seriously consider utilizing these drastic and complex 
adaptation measures. 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS UNIQUE THREAT TO SIDS 
In order to gain a better understanding of the unique and dire situation 
faced by many SIDS, one must understand the geographic situation of SIDS 
and the climate predictions. There are currently fifty-two SIDS17 located 
across the Indian, Pacific, and Atlantic Oceans, as well as the Caribbean 
Sea.18 Most SIDS are extremely poor, very susceptible to natural disasters, 
and significantly influenced by ocean-atmosphere reactions that manifest 
themselves in extreme weather events such as hurricanes and cyclones.19 
Twelve SIDS have “Least Developed Country Status,”20 which means they 
are characterized by “[e]xtreme poverty, the structural weakness of their 
economies and the lack of capacities related to growth, often compounded 
by structural handicaps.”21 Despite SIDS’ geographical and cultural 
diversity, they share many characteristics and similar economic and 
sustainable development challenges: small but rapidly growing populations, 
remoteness, susceptibility to natural disasters, excessive dependence on 
international trade, and vulnerability to global development.22 These 
characteristics make SIDS extremely vulnerable to climate change, and 
those with the lowest elevations will likely be its first nation-victims. 
Additional characteristics make SIDS extremely vulnerable to climate 
change. Many SIDS rise no more than three to four meters above sea level. 
Most SIDS have very limited water resources and arable land,23 which 
means that rising sea levels will lead to saltwater intrusion into the limited 
freshwater resources and soil salinization of the few arable lands.24 
Saltwater intrusion will contaminate water used for drinking and 
agriculture. Soil salinization is a significant threat to domestic food 
productions and cash crop exports.25 Sea level rise will also cause enhanced 
coastal erosion, loss of property, and dislocation of people. The projected 
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rise in sea level will also be accompanied by changes in precipitation 
patterns, more intense storms, pressure on biodiversity, and coral 
destruction due to bleaching and ocean acidification.26 Finally, many SIDS 
economies rely heavily on tourism, which climate change will greatly 
affect.27 
Understanding the already precarious geographical position of many 
SIDS, it is clear that the effects of climate change on SIDS will be dire. 
While some argue that climate change is not real or is overstated, the 
overwhelming scientific consensus is that anthropogenic (man-made) 
climate change is occurring.28 Furthermore, it is widely recognized that if 
climate change is not addressed aggressively, it will force the world to 
spend an exorbitant amount of money to adapt to a very different and less-
stable climate.29 
One study on climate change that policy makers worldwide have utilized 
is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth 
Assessment Report.30 In the report, the IPCC estimated various Surface Air 
Temperature (SAT) increase scenarios and the sea level rise that each 
scenario would cause by 2100. These scenarios are based on computer 
models using different emissions scenarios ranging from nonmitigation to 
idealized mitigation scenarios.31 (Mitigation is a term used to describe 
efforts to decrease greenhouse gas (GHG)32 emissions.) The six SAT 
scenarios range from a 1.1°C to a 6.4°C increase in global temperatures.33 
These increases would create a corresponding sea level rise of 0.18–0.59 
meters.34 Furthermore, the IPCC estimated with medium confidence (50 
percent chance35) that within centuries to millennia there will be at least 
partial deglaciation of the Greenland ice sheet and possibly the West 
Antarctic ice sheet.36 This would cause a sea level rise of four to six meters 
or more.37 The complete melting of the both Greenland and West Antarctic 
ice sheets would lead to a sea level rise of twelve meters.38 
According to the IPCC, climate change impacts will be mixed across 
regions.39 For example, a few northern latitude areas will experience net 
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benefits with an increase in temperature of less than 1°C–3°C.40 However, 
for other areas of the world, including most SIDS, climate change, even at a 
small temperature increase, will have drastic effects on the weather and 
environment, effectively making it more difficult, if not impossible, for 
people to live in their surroundings.41 It is very likely that all regions of the 
world will experience either declines in net benefits or increases in net costs 
at an increase in temperature of over 2°C–3°C.42 
This phenomenon of differentiated effects is significant for the future of 
SIDS. While some of the poorest countries in the world, like SIDS, are 
attempting to cope with the most severe effects of climate change, most 
developed countries, like the United States, are encountering minimal 
effects.43 This creates a situation in which developing nations that are least 
politically and financially capable of addressing climate change attempt to 
force action on the international stage. At the same time, many nations that 
are in the best position to comprehensively address climate change, like the 
United States, are unwilling to take action because they are not currently 
faced with immediate and present discernable threats.44 In short, 
differentiated effects are making it difficult for SIDS, or any other nation, to 
begin to meaningfully address the effects of climate change. 
While the prognosis for many vulnerable SIDS was already bleak under 
the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, many believe that the IPCC 
drastically underestimated projected sea level rise. A United States 
Geologic Survey study of published scientific literature and models based 
on new information concluded that sea level rise will likely (65 percent45) 
substantially exceed 2007 IPCC projections.46 Similarly, Katherine 
Richardson, the head of the Danish government’s Commission on Climate 
Change Policy, said the 2007’s IPCC Fourth Assessment Report is 
outdated.47 
Many new estimates of projected sea level rise are much higher than the 
IPCC estimates. Professor Konrad Steffan from the University of Colorado 
predicts a one-meter increase by 2100 because of increased ice loss in 
Sinking Nations & Climate Change Adaptation Strategies 453 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
Greenland.48 This prediction is three times the average predicted by the 
IPCC.49 Echoing this prediction, Professor Eric Rignot, a senior NASA 
scientist, said that new studies show that Greenland and Antarctica are 
contributing more and faster to sea level rise than anticipated.50 Some 
predict an increase in sea level of more than one meter by 2100. For 
example, Professor Stefan Ramstorf of the Potsdam Institute for Climate 
Impact Research estimates an increase in sea level by 2100 of nearly two 
meters.51 Similarly, a 2009 study in Science indicates that the IPCC did not 
take into account certain feedback loops, and sea levels could rise two 
meters by 2100.52 
While all SIDS are very vulnerable to climate change, especially if the 
new predictions are correct, some SIDS are extremely vulnerable and will 
feel the effects sooner than other SIDS. The small island nation of Tuvalu is 
the perfect example of an extremely vulnerable SIDS. Tuvalu is a nation of 
just over twelve thousand people located in the South Pacific Ocean and is 
just one-tenth the size of Washington, D.C.53 Tuvalu is an extremely poor 
nation, grossing under $15 million per year. (Globally, Tuvalu ranks 224 
out of 226 in GDP).54 Rising sea levels have already significantly affected 
the tiny island nation. In 2000, the nation’s major airport runway was 
flooded for five months.55 Additionally, the extreme shortage of land, 
coupled with sea erosion, has made it difficult for Tuvaluans to find places 
to bury their dead.56 Because rising seas have already eroded the nation’s 
main burial ground, people are incorporating graves into their homes.57 
The Maldives is another example of a SIDS that is already extremely at 
risk. The Maldives are 1,190 coral islands grouped into twenty-six atolls in 
the Arabian Sea.58 The highest point is just 2.4 meters above sea level,59 and 
the average elevation is 1–1.5 meters above sea level.60 The population is 
396,334, and tourism accounts for 28 percent of GDP.61 The significantly 
larger population of the Maldives, as compared to that of Tuvalu (twelve 
thousand people), partially illustrates the severe problem of rising sea 
levels. While relocating twelve thousand people is a large undertaking, the 
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relocation of nearly four hundred thousand people would be a massive and 
difficult operation. 
Unlike many other countries of the world, SIDS like Tuvalu and the 
Maldives are unable to adequately adapt to the predicted rise in sea levels 
while simultaneously living on their island homes. Developed nations, in 
contrast, are adequately equipped for this challenge. For example, U.S. 
citizens can avoid rising seas by moving inland to higher ground with the 
assistance of a large and wealthy government. While relocating people from 
low-lying coastal areas to high elevations would undoubtedly be costly and 
difficult, countries like the United States could adapt to rising sea levels 
completely on their own.   
Many other countries may not be as capable of easily adapting to rising 
sea levels as the United States, but they are still in a much better situation 
than many SIDS. For example, a sea level rise of one meter could place 
more than one-fifth of Bangladesh (a nation of 160 million people62) 
underwater, driving millions of people to migrate to neighboring India and 
Burma.63 While the potential geopolitical conflicts that could arise from 
such a massive forced migration are enormous, and climate-related shocks 
have already sparked violent conflict in the past,64 a Bangladeshi is still in a 
better position than a Tuvaluan or Maldivian.65 
Citizens of most SIDS cannot merely relocate to higher ground within 
their own country. These citizens do not even have the opportunity to cross 
a border into a neighboring country. Instead, climate change will force 
refugees from SIDS to leave their homelands and move across oceans to 
other countries. This reality is why the situation facing SIDS is so unique 
and dire. To citizens of many SIDS, rising sea levels threaten to effectively 
destroy their countries. Absent a significant global shift in climate policy 
and billions of dollars of investment in climate adaptation and mitigation 
measures, the inhabitants of SIDS may not only be among the first climate 
refugees, but their nations may be the first sovereignties destroyed by 
climate change. 
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III. THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Climate change, described as the “silent, patient, and invisible enemy,”66 
is an extremely vexing problem for two main reasons. First, the geographic 
scale of climate change is truly worldwide. Nearly everyone in the world 
emits GHGs, and most GHGs then circle the globe. For example, a ton of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted over New York City has the same effect on 
climate change as a ton emitted over Paris, Shanghai, or Honolulu.67 
Therefore, nearly everyone in the world is contributing to climate change. 
Because climate change affects, indirectly or directly, every corner of the 
earth, any real solution must truly be a global solution. 
Second, the effects of climate change will be difficult to deal with 
because of their temporal dimension. Once emitted, CO2 stays in the air for 
up to 150 years,68 which means that emissions created during the Industrial 
Revolution are much of the cause of the climate change problems facing the 
world today. If somehow all CO2 emissions stopped today, the atmosphere 
in 2107 would still contain about 90 percent of the CO2 that it contains 
today.69 
This complex temporal dimension poses a few problems. First, absent the 
development of technology that removes carbon from the air, many effects 
of climate change are irreversible. Second, it is very difficult to decide who 
should pay for the negative effects of climate change. The developing world 
argues that the developed world should bear the brunt of the costs because 
the developed world has put most of the carbon into the air.70 At the same 
time, much of the developed world refuses to pay unless the developing 
world agrees to pay.71 Third, the largest cause of climate change comes 
from the burning of fossil fuels,72 which nearly all of the world’s economies 
rely on for energy. Therefore, while successful mitigation of the effects of 
climate change would likely not force economies to crumble, the transition 
from fossil fuel economies to renewable energy economies would take 
significant time, money, and political capital. 
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Despite the magnitude and complexity of the problem, the international 
community is committed, rhetorically, to aiding SIDS and other vulnerable 
populations in addressing climate change. This rhetorical commitment to 
assist the developing world with environmental degradation began to take 
shape in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
(“Stockholm Declaration”).73 Principle 11 states that “[t]he environmental 
policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present or 
future development of developing countries.”74 Principle 12 states that the 
international community should take into account the “circumstances and 
particular requirements of developing countries.”75 Finally, Principle 22 
urges the development of “international law regarding liability and 
compensation for victims of pollution and environmental damage.”76 
This rhetorical commitment of the international community continued 
with the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (“Rio 
Declaration”).77 The Rio Declaration reaffirmed the Stockholm 
Declaration78 and added some important ideas that are necessary for the 
world community to address climate change. Principle 6 of the Declaration 
states that “[t]he special situation and needs of developing countries, 
particularly the least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, 
shall be given special priority.”79 Principle 7 presents the important idea that 
“because of different contributions to environmental degradation, States 
have common but differentiated responsibilities.”80 Finally, Principle 15 
expressly states the precautionary principle: “[w]here there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”81 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the first attempt to create a global climate change legal regime, 
was also drafted at the 1992 Rio Summit. The UNFCCC is a constitution-
like document that embraced the precautionary principle and adopted an 
ultimate objective of stabilizing GHG concentrations at a level that would 
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prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.82 To 
achieve this, the UNFCCC proposed returning to 1990 emissions levels.83 
Like the Rio Declaration, the UNFCCC embraced the idea of differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities and spoke of “equitable and 
appropriate contributions by each [country] to the global effort” to fight 
climate change.84 The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994, and as of 
August 2010, 194 nations are party to the Convention.85 
The UNFCCC led to the Kyoto Protocol (Protocol),86 which appeared to 
be an attempt to transition from rhetorical commitments to an actual legal 
commitment to address climate change. The Protocol endeavored to be a 
legal mechanism that addressed climate change.87 The Protocol ultimately 
failed to be a true solution to climate change for many reasons. For 
example, the Protocol attempted to institute emissions caps on developed, 
but not developing, countries.88 Therefore, large emitters that were 
developing, like China and India, would not have emissions caps. This led 
to a domestic political backlash in many developed countries, because many 
thought it unfair to allow developing countries to freely emit while their 
own countries would be bound to an international agreement that capped 
their GHG emissions.89 
Protocol negotiations ultimately collapsed in 2001 when the Bush 
Administration formally repudiated the Protocol.90 In 2005, the Protocol 
finally received a sufficient number of ratifications to enter into force;91 
however, the estimated effect of the Protocol since then has been minimal. 
A prominent study indicated that full compliance with the Protocol would 
reduce warming by a mere 0.03°C by 2100.92 
Notwithstanding the failure of the global community to address climate 
change for decades, there was great hope that the fifteenth Conference of 
the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in December 2009 would produce a 
comprehensive international climate change agreement. Despite the 
optimism leading into COP 15, the international community again failed to 
comprehensively address climate change. 
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The Copenhagen Accord (Accord),93 which was agreed to at COP 15, 
appears to be an agreement to delay dealing with climate change for years 
while repeating much of the rhetoric seen in the prior agreements. 
Specifically, the Accord adopts a maximum increase in global temperature 
of 2°C and directs Annex I countries94 from the Protocol to implement 
economy-wide targets by 2020.95 However, these targets are not part of the 
Accord.96 Essentially, the Accord is an agreement to agree on the 
implementation of emissions targets by 2020. 
Not only has the international community failed to adopt an international 
legal regime that would effectively address climate change, but it appears 
that the commitments in the UNFCCC—the bedrock of international 
climate change cooperation—were forgotten. The 192 signatories to the 
UNFCCC committed to stabilize GHGs at concentrations that would 
“prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”97 
and pledged that the UNFCCC would guide the nations by, among other 
things, the “specific needs and special circumstances of developing 
countries.”98 Despite this rhetorical commitment to assist developing 
countries and promote the goal of stabilizing emissions, the Group of Eight 
(G-8)99 and the Accord have stated a goal of not permitting global 
temperatures to rise more than 2°C.100 However, at an increase in global 
temperatures of 2°C, some SIDS will likely be underwater. Acceptance of a 
goal that will submerge some of the most vulnerable nations is neither 
prevention of dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system, nor is it a recognition of the “specific needs and special 
circumstances”101 of those nations. The UNFCCC and the Protocol have 
done little for SIDS, and while discussions are ongoing under the UNFCCC, 
the international community appears content to put off seriously dealing 
with climate change until another day.102 
SIDS, like the world community, have recognized the severity of the risk 
they face due to climate change. Despite their effort, SIDS have failed to get 
the world community to effectively act to curb climate change, as 
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demonstrated by the decades of international negotiations discussed above 
that have resulted in minimal action. Therefore, SIDS have recently 
increased their efforts to force some type of meaningful action via both the 
traditional channels of international organizations and popular media. Many 
SIDS joined in the creation of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in 
1991, which is a coalition of small islands and low-lying coastal countries 
that share similar development challenges and concerns about the 
environment.103 The AOSIS operates as an ad hoc lobby and is the 
negotiating voice for SIDS within the United Nations (UN) system.104 
In 2009, the AOSIS signed a Declaration on Climate Change, which 
voiced its member-nations’ concerns over the effects of climate change and 
disappointment in the lack of progress, and it ultimately made a plea to the 
international community to address climate change immediately.105 In June 
2009, the Pacific SIDS introduced a draft resolution expressing deep 
concern over climate change and urging the UN organs to intensify their 
efforts to address climate change.106 
Additionally, at COP 15, SIDS aggressively attempted to force action. 
The AOSIS proposed a maximum increase of temperature of 1.5°C,107 and 
Tuvalu pushed for a legally binding agreement by the end of the 
negotiations.108 Also, President Nasheed of the Maldives gave impassioned 
speeches in which he called for the world to finally address climate 
change.109 Unfortunately, these attempts failed. 
Understanding that the normal channels of political action have not 
worked to force action on climate change, SIDS have begun engaging in 
publicity tactics to gain attention and support from the general global 
public. For example, the nation of Tuvalu has virtually no exports, but 
Tuvaluans recently created a special-issue postage stamp raising the issue of 
climate change.110 The stamp reads “Climate Change. Please Protect Our 
Environment.”111 In a similar headline-grabbing act in October 2009, the 
Maldives Cabinet donned scuba gear and convened underwater to sign a 
document urging countries to curb their carbon emissions.112 Also, the 
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Maldives has committed to become the first carbon-neutral country.113 
These actions demonstrate that SIDS are trying everything possible to force 
action on climate change. 
SIDS understand that climate change places them in a very precarious 
position and that they will be forced to leave their homelands if climate 
change is not seriously addressed by the world community. Despite their 
best efforts to focus attention on their vulnerable situations, SIDS have been 
unable to spark meaningful action. Nevertheless, opportunities are still 
available for the international community to address climate change in a 
significant way, and a successful global strategy could be very beneficial to 
SIDS. 
IV. HOW TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE AND SINKING NATIONS: 
MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION 
Because the international community is unwilling or unable to help, SIDS 
may have to craft solutions of their own. Two types of strategies—
mitigation and adaptation—can fight the worst effects of climate change 
and diminish the risks associated with climate change.114 Mitigation refers 
to reducing concentrations of GHGs by either reducing their sources or 
increasing their sinks.115 While mitigation is absolutely necessary to 
comprehensively address climate change, due to its complex temporal 
dimension discussed above, mitigation efforts will only provide minimal 
relief for SIDS. Adaptation is necessary if SIDS hope to survive climate 
change. 
Adaptation refers to adjustments in natural and human systems that 
attempt to moderate the effects of climate change.116 SIDS have been 
engaged in adaptation strategies for years through individual, ad hoc action 
on a local scale.117 For example, in Vanuatu, the Canadian government has 
provided funding for the relocation of one hundred villagers.118 The 
relocation was necessary because frequent flooding and erosion had made 
the original settlement uninhabitable.119 Similarly, the town of Playa 
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Rosario, Cuba, relocated five kilometers inland because of coastal 
erosion.120 Additionally, on the Timor Islands, farmers have developed 
different staple crops, adapting to erratic rainfall and cyclones to ensure 
food security.121 Other adaptation strategies targeted biodiversity and land 
degradation, infrastructure and settlements, and water resources.122 Given 
the realities of problems facing SIDS discussed in Section II, it is necessary 
that the global community develop large-scale adaptation strategies. 
Recognizing and identifying goals of adaptation strategies for SIDS will 
assist in the creation and implementation of these strategies. The first and 
most important goal of any adaptation strategy should be to provide climate 
change refugees a place to live. The international community cannot stand 
by and watch while people’s communities and nations are swallowed up by 
rising sea levels, because those most vulnerable did very little to put 
themselves in this situation. In fact, those not immediately at risk of 
becoming climate change refugees emitted most of the GHGs that have 
created the problem of rising sea levels.123 Also, because climate change is 
truly caused by everyone in the world, everyone must assist those that are 
most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 
Second, any adaptation strategy must keep families together, as climate 
change forces them to relocate. As stated above, SIDS did very little to 
contribute to their situation. Therefore, the international community should 
make it a priority to keep families together as they a relocate.  
Third, any adaptation strategy should have a goal of protecting cultural 
practices. Each of these nations has unique cultural practices, and their 
survival should be protected. Assuring that families stay together will assist 
in achieving this goal. 
Finally, the international community should seize the opportunity of 
assisting SIDS to adapt to climate change in order to develop large-scale 
climate change adaptation strategies. While adapting SIDS to climate 
change will be an enormous task, it pales in comparison to the requirements 
of adapting large populations of people to rising sea levels. The effects on 
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Bangladesh of a one-meter sea level rise were discussed above—
displacement of tens of millions of people.124 Other countries with very 
large populations are also at risk from rising sea levels. For instance, 
Bangkok, Thailand, has a metro-area population of over 11 million people 
and is only 1.5–2 meters above sea level.125 If sea levels continue to rise, 
large population centers like Bangkok and Bangladesh may require 
evacuation. The international community should utilize the opportunity to 
help SIDS adapt to rising sea levels by developing a successful method and 
strategy of adaptation that is transferable to larger population centers. 
V. LARGE-SCALE ADAPTATION STRATEGIES 
A. Global Immigration Adaptation Strategy 
Immigration is a possible adaptation strategy for SIDS faced with losing 
their homelands to rising sea levels. Under this strategy, citizens of SIDS 
that are no longer inhabitable would move to other countries. While 
immigration has the potential to partially address the problems faced by 
SIDS, the international community must implement it in an organized and 
purposeful fashion—not in an ad hoc manner as previous immigration 
programs. An ad hoc immigration approach implemented separately by 
different countries would not effectively resolve the problem and, instead, 
would likely transform many inhabitants of SIDS into refugees with 
nowhere to go. For this strategy to succeed, the global community must 
alter its traditional ideas about immigration. To truly deal with the large 
numbers of immigrants fleeing rising sea levels, the world community must 
create a comprehensive immigration system. 
1.  New Zealand’s Example of Why Ad Hoc Immigration Laws Will 
Not Work 
New Zealand’s “Pacific Access Category”126 is an example of an ad hoc 
immigration system that will not solve the problem facing many SIDS. New 
Zealand created this special category in their immigration law to allow up to 
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four hundred able-bodied adults, between the ages of eighteen and forty-
five, who have no criminal records and who are from the SIDS of Fiji, 
Kiribati, Tonga, or Tuvalu, to immigrate to New Zealand each year.127 
While New Zealand’s law recognizes the precarious position of many 
SIDS, it raises many concerns. First, the program only allows up to four 
hundred people to immigrate each year. The Maldives alone has nearly four 
hundred thousand inhabitants,128 and therefore, implementing such a small 
solution, even if replicated by numerous countries in the world, would not 
adequately provide timely placement for all Maldivians, let alone other 
inhabitants of SIDS. To be a meaningful adaptation strategy, all countries 
that could accommodate immigrants must adopt an immigration system that 
allows for a significant number of SIDS refugees. 
New Zealand’s law also raises important social justice issues. In addition 
to the program’s small size, it only allows for the immigration of able-
bodied adults, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, with no criminal 
records. The Maldives have nearly one hundred thousand people under the 
age of fourteen and over fifteen thousand people over the age of sixty-
five.129 Per the New Zealand law, these inhabitants would not be able to 
immigrate. Moreover, the immigration program will break up families and 
communities. The program quota is too small and its requirements too 
specific to allow for many families to stay together when they immigrate. In 
addition to the destruction of families, climate change threatens to break 
apart entire communities and, in effect, lose their unique cultural heritage.  
A replication of this law by other countries has the potential to leave a 
large portion of people from SIDS with nowhere to go. Therefore, any 
immigration law must allow all citizens of SIDS, and not just able-bodied, 
working age-adults, to immigrate. 
2.  Design of a Global Immigration Adaptation Strategy 
Any immigration adaptation strategy must be implemented 
comprehensively by the world community for multiple reasons. First, 
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climate change is a global problem. While climate change does not 
uniformly affect every country, every country participated in the creation of 
the problem; therefore, every country should participate in the solution. 
Second, there is the potential for an enormous number of climate change 
refugees. No one can force any country to take in all SIDS climate change 
refugees. There must be a system of allocation, and this can only occur 
through international cooperation. Finally, the ultimate goal of any 
immigration system that assists SIDS in adapting to climate change is to 
provide its inhabitants a place to live. Therefore, each sovereign nation must 
subjugate its individual goals, such as only allowing the immigration of 
able-bodied, working-age adults, in order to serve the more important goal 
of giving people a place to live. Since all nations would share the same 
goals for the immigration program, such a program must be international in 
scope. 
To achieve the second and third goals of adaptation, keeping families 
together and ensuring the survival of cultural heritage, immigration laws 
must be family-centered, not centered on individuals. Therefore, there can 
be no age limitations, and nations must adjust their quotas to allow entire 
families to immigrate together. Also, nations must define families broadly 
to include extended family. This is the only way to ensure that families are 
not broken up and that cultural heritage will continue to survive after 
immigration. 
Once the international community recognizes these three broad reasons 
for implementing the adaptation strategy in its global immigration 
adaptation strategy, the next issue is who will open their borders to these 
refugees. While some countries, like New Zealand, have already opened 
their borders, many more countries must permit immigrants from SIDS if 
the immigration adaptation strategy is going to be effective. 
One way to determine who should bear the cost of allowing immigrants 
of SIDS to live in their countries is to consider the ethical issues of climate 
change. Using the principle that those who caused the environmental 
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degradation should bear the burden of its effects, an “ethical alternative” is 
to provide phased immigration benefits.130 This system would allow 
vulnerable populations to migrate to other countries before rising sea levels 
inundate their homelands. Each country would base the number of migrants 
it accepts on a rough proportion of the host country’s cumulative GHG 
emissions.131 Using the top ten historic polluters (cumulative emission from 
1850–2003)132 and using the Maldives as an example, the immigrations 
statistics would look something like those in Table 1. 
Table 1. Implementation of Immigration Strategy on the Maldives 
 
Country Historic Pollution 
Level (%) 
Total Number of Immigrants 
Received from the Maldives 
United States 29 114,936 
European Union 26 103,047 
China 8 31,707 
Russia 8 31,707 
Germany 7 27,743 
Other 7 27,743 
United Kingdom 6 23,780  
Japan 4 15,853 
India 2 7,792  
Canada 2 7,792  
South Korea 1 3,963  
 The top ten historic polluters only account for about 93 percent of the 
historic pollution—leaving 7 percent unaccounted for—which means that 
the international community would either have to allocate just under 
twenty-eight thousand Maldivian refugees to countries not listed above or 
further split up the refugees between the top ten historic polluters. 
From an environmental justice view, such a system makes sense. The 
basic thrust of environmental justice is that all persons, without regard to 
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race or socio-economic status, are entitled to equal treatment concerning the 
distribution of the environmental benefits and burdens of modern society.133 
The countries listed above developed and became wealthy because they 
have historically polluted freely and externalized many of pollution’s costs. 
These externalized costs have been borne by people throughout the world, 
but the costs proved too much for SIDS to internalize, rendering their 
homelands uninhabitable. However, through immigration to these historic 
polluting nations, the SIDS migrants will receive pollution’s “benefits”—
the benefits associated with living in a developed nation. Therefore, these 
immigrants will no longer merely bear the burden caused by pollution, but 
will finally enjoy some of its benefits. This is an appropriate distribution of 
costs and benefits.134 
Support for such a global immigration system is located within the 
UNFCCC. Article 3(2) discusses the “specific and special circumstances of 
developing countr[ies] . . . especially those that are particularly vulnerable 
to the adverse effects of climate change.”135 Article 4(2)(a) discusses the 
“need for equitable and appropriate contributions of [developed countries] 
to the global effort” to combat climate change.136 Article 4(8) states that 
parties to the UNFCCC must give “full consideration to what actions are 
necessary” to meet the “specific needs and concerns of developing 
nations.”137 Finally, Article 4(8)(a) specifically lists “[s]mall island 
countries” as developing nations that the international community must 
fully consider.138 These provisions recognize the need for developed nations 
to give developing nations, particularly SIDS, large amounts of support in 
adapting to climate change. Acceptance of immigrants from SIDS is an 
example of the type of support for developing nations envisioned by the 
UNFCCC. 
Theoretically, a global immigration system based on the model above is 
an environmentally just method of solving the problems facing SIDS. The 
system would make the primary beneficiaries of pollution pay for the 
effects of the pollution. Also, it would avoid the problems that plague ad 
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hoc solutions, such as the one used in New Zealand. All people forced to 
leave their homeland would have a place to go. Given that each historic 
polluter would have to accept a relatively large number of people, the 
system design could allow most families to remain intact. In addition to 
keeping families together, this would assist in the preservation of unique 
cultural practices. 
3.  The Pros and Cons of a Global Immigration Adaptation Strategy 
Despite the positive aspects of this immigration proposal, it still presents 
significant problems. Domestically, the host countries could have serious 
political difficulties trying to pass legislation that would commit the country 
to accepting a significant number of climate refugees. Throughout the 
world, and particularly in the United States, there has been extreme 
hesitancy, and in some cases outright refusal,139 to be bound to international 
agreements regarding climate change. Countries could employ the same 
arguments, used to defeat a global climate change legal regime, to fight 
acceptance of climate refugees into one’s country. Certain constituencies in 
historically polluting countries will likely argue that their particular 
countries should not accept the burden of taking in these climate refugees 
unless developing countries also agree to allow climate refugees to 
immigrate. As proven with the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which effectively 
prohibited President Clinton from entering into the Kyoto Protocol and was 
passed almost unanimously in the U.S. Senate,140 such a protectionist 
argument can gain significant support. 
Also, anti-immigration sentiment could proliferate, making it difficult for 
politicians to support such a global immigration measure. History has 
demonstrated the power of xenophobic rhetoric and sentiment in countries 
around the world. For example, the U.S. Congress would likely find it 
difficult to pass domestic legislation that would commit the United States to 
accept nearly 30 percent of the world’s climate refugees. Recently, in the 
United States, xenophobic rhetoric has gained a foothold in popular media 
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concerning the continuing immigration debate.141 Legislatures in other 
countries around the world would likely encounter the same difficulties, 
particularly in countries that are less heterogeneous than the United States 
and have not historically accepted as many immigrants. 
Despite the knee-jerk political reaction likely to occur in host nations, 
there are significant domestic benefits that host nations could experience by 
accepting new immigrants. Besides the United States and India, the rest of 
the top ten historic polluters are facing extreme demographic crises,142 such 
as lower birth rates leading to shrinking populations.143 Also, people are 
living much longer,144 which is significantly taxing on social welfare 
programs aimed at keeping elderly populations—who no longer work—out 
of poverty (e.g., social security in the United States145). An influx of people 
into the labor force could boost the economy in many nations and assist in 
supporting social welfare programs that support aging generations.146 
Additionally, the acceptance of immigrants could enhance cultural diversity 
in many host nations. 
While the comprehensive global immigration strategy appears to be a 
viable solution to the problem currently facing SIDS, it is not perfect. SIDS 
are sovereign nations, and any immigration strategy has the potential to 
completely disband a sovereign nation. The citizens of each SIDS would be 
absorbed by the nation to which they would immigrate. To allow climate 
change to force a sovereign nation to dissolve when the nation contributed 
so little to its own demise does not seem fair. Despite the fact that a just 
redistribution of benefits would occur under such an immigration strategy, 
there are losses for which the global community could not compensate the 
SIDS. One’s sovereign homeland is not a tangible good that can be assigned 
adequate compensation. While most families may stay together under the 
global immigration regime described above, the society’s unique ways of 
life and historical practices would likely disappear. The sentiment of many 
island-nation citizens is that they do not want to abandon their homelands or 
be absorbed into other cultures where indigenous people already struggle 
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for acceptance.147 An analyst with the Palauan Ministry of Resources and 
Development said, “It is about much more than just finding food and shelter 
. . . . It is about your identity.”148 
B. Relocation Adaptation Strategy  
Mohamed Nasheed, the president of the Maldives, has a new idea for 
adaptation that aims to avoid some of the adverse effects of an immigration 
strategy. President Nasheed created a sovereign wealth fund, generated by a 
portion of the country’s annual billion-dollar tourist industry, and plans to 
use it to buy his country a new homeland.149 The idea is that the Maldives 
would buy a large parcel of land from another country and then relocate its 
entire population. This way, the Maldives would still be a sovereign nation, 
just in another location. President Nasheed said that while Maldivians do 
not want to leave their island homes, they also “do not want to be climate 
refugees living in tents for decades.”150 
This adaptation strategy is creative and raises a whole host of novel legal 
and political issues. In modern history, no country has purchased land from 
another country to completely relocate; therefore, there is no analogy to 
assist in developing and implementing such an adaptation technique. 
However, much of the same theoretical, social, and environmental justice 
concerns that underpin the global immigration strategy provide guidance for 
the design of this relocation adaptation strategy. 
1. Who Pays for and Provides the Land for Relocation? 
For the environmental justice reasons discussed above, it would be 
fundamentally unfair to force SIDS to pay for their own relocation. The 
environmental justice rationale supporting the idea—that the world’s 
historic polluters should accept climate change refugees as immigrants—
also supports the argument that a historic polluter should provide a piece of 
land for the relocated SIDS. Also, the rest of the historic polluters should 
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compensate that country for providing the land. This system would most 
fairly distribute the true cost of pollution. 
The rationale behind the U.S. Constitution’s takings clause provides 
support for such a redistributive justice approach. Under this law, if the 
government takes private property for public use, the government must 
compensate the private property owner,151 because it would be unfair for the 
private property owner to bear the burden of providing a benefit to the 
public. A similar situation has occurred in the context of climate change and 
SIDS. Historic polluters have industrialized by emitting large amounts of 
GHGs, and those GHGs have raised global temperatures, which in turn, 
have caused sea levels to rise and submerge SIDS property. In other words, 
historic polluters have “taken” SIDS property for the benefit of their own 
populations. It is unfair for SIDS to bear the cost of the pollution while the 
historic polluters enjoy all the benefits; therefore, it is socially and 
environmentally just for the historic polluters to pay for the “taking” of 
SIDS. 
Similarly, the rationale underpinning the United States’ nuisance law 
supports this redistributive justice approach. A state, county, or 
municipality can bring a public nuisance suit against a party that is 
unreasonably interfering with a right common to the public (e.g., clean air, 
clean water, etc.).152 Here, the right common to any particular SIDS is to be 
a sovereign nation (i.e., to not have their nation subsumed by rising sea 
levels caused by polluting nations). Normally, if the plaintiff succeeds in 
her public nuisance action, the defendant is enjoined from continuing the 
unreasonable activity.153 In the climate change situation, enjoining every 
country from continuing to emit GHGs is impossible. Nevertheless, the 
international community could use monetary damages to put SIDS as close 
to their rightful position as possible (i.e., the position the SIDS would have 
enjoyed had rising sea levels not made their nation uninhabitable). That 
rightful position is existence as a sovereign nation. Therefore, using the 
nuisance analogy, the countries causing the nuisance should fully 
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compensate a SIDS that has been forced to relocate, restoring its status as a 
sovereign nation. This can be done if one nuisance-causing nation provides 
the land for relocation and the rest of the nuisance-causing nations 
compensate the nation that provided the land. This way, the nations that do 
not provide land for relocation are not enjoying a windfall. 
This model for the relocation strategy follows a similar model to the 
immigration strategy. Each country should pay a certain percentage of the 
costs associated with the relocation of a SIDS, determined by the country’s 
historic pollution levels. For example, if it cost $1 billion to pay for the land 
being given to the SIDS, the cost apportionment could follow Table 2’s 
distribution. 
Table 2. Hypothetical Cost Apportionment for Relocation of a SIDS 
 
Country Historic Pollution 
Level (%) 
Proportion of Cost to be Paid 
United States 29 $290,000,000 
European Union 26 $260,000,000 
China 8 $80,000,000 
Russia 8 $80,000,000 
Germany 7 $70,000,000 
Other 7 $70,000,000 
United Kingdom 6 $60,000,000 
Japan 4 $40,000,000 
India 2 $20,000,000 
Canada 2 $20,000,000 
South Korea 1 $10,000,000 
 As with the immigration strategy, 7 percent of costs are not covered by 
the top ten historic polluters. Therefore, under the hypothetical, $70 million 
would have to either be apportioned among the top ten or be paid by 
countries that are not in the top ten to make up the difference. 
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Once every country has been apportioned its fair share of the cost, the 
global community must determine who will provide land for the relocation. 
While unlikely, it is possible that a country will voluntarily decide to 
provide the land. In that case, the rest of the countries should compensate 
that country for its land. For example, if Australia agreed to provide the 
land for relocation and that land is worth $1 billion, Australia would be paid 
$290 million by the United States (the United States emitted 29 percent of 
historic GHG emissions), $260 million would be paid by the European 
Union (the European Union emitted 26 percent of historic GHG emissions), 
and so forth. This regime would ensure that the benefits and burdens are 
apportioned properly. Every country would pay its fair share, and the SIDS 
would share in the benefits derived by the historic polluting nations. 
Like the global immigration adaptation strategy discussed above, the 
UNFCCC appears to provide support for this adaptation strategy. Article 3 
urges countries to protect the climate on the “basis of equity and in 
accordance with . . . common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.”154 Article 4 expressly states that developed nations 
must consider the “specific needs and concerns of developing countr[ies]… 
arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the 
implementation of response measures.”155 
2. Political Problems of the Relocation Adaptation Strategy 
This relocation adaptation strategy clearly creates a host of problems. 
First, the international political problems are significant. For this type of 
program to function, countries would have to accept fault for historic 
pollution. Recently, there appears to be some international consensus 
emerging that developed countries must pay to help developing countries 
adapt to climate change. The European Union recently unveiled a proposal 
in which industrialized nations and economically advanced developing 
countries would provide $33 billion to $74 billion a year to help developing 
countries adapt to climate change.156 Given this current trend, it appears 
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possible that the international community may be able to politically agree to 
a program such as this adaptation relocation regime. 
Domestic politics would create another enormous hurdle because a 
country would be unlikely to cede a portion of its sovereign territory for the 
relocation of a SIDS. However, support may be increasing in some 
countries. The governing party in Australia, the Labor Party, authored a 
policy paper entitled “Our Drowning Neighbors,” which states that 
Australia should help facilitate an international coalition to address the 
unique problems posed by climate change to developing nations.157 The 
environmental justice aspects of the problem might actually create a 
political atmosphere in which a country willingly agrees to cede part of its 
sovereign territory to a SIDS. Even so, absent a nation voluntarily providing 
land, domestic politics would almost certainly prevent a relocation 
adaptation strategy from working. 
Another problem raised by the relocation adaptation strategy is the 
sovereign status of the newly relocated SIDS. The Montevideo Convention 
on Rights and Duties of States, a convention agreed to by the United States 
and seventeen Latin American and Caribbean nations,158 could be utilized 
as it attempted to define what it means to be a “sovereign state.” Article 1 
indicates that a state should possess (1) a permanent population, (2) a 
defined territory, (3) a government, and (4) the capacity to enter into 
relations with other States.159 Article 5 states that “[t]he fundamental rights 
of [a] state are not susceptible of being affected in any manner whatsoever.” 
Similarly, Article 8 states that “[n]o state has the right to intervene in the 
internal . . . affairs of another,”160 and Article 11 states that “[t]he territory 
of a state is inviolable.”161 In short, to be a true state, the relocated SIDS 
would have to be completely sovereign. When a host country agrees to 
relocate a SIDS onto its territory, the host must not only agree to cede land 
to a SIDS, but also political sovereignty over that land. 
Even assuming that the previously discussed problems are solved—that 
there is an international political agreement to create the relocation 
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adaptation strategy, a country agrees to cede land, and the SIDS is allowed 
to be sovereign—there are still additional problems that the international 
community must resolve before implementing a relocation strategy. 
3.  Further Problems: What Land is Given to the Relocating SIDS? 
Deciding which land and what type of land to give to the relocating SIDS 
remains a difficult issue. First, the SIDS must be given land that is 
inhabitable. Therefore, the world community cannot just give a SIDS a 
large chunk of the Sahara Desert and call the program a success. Similarly, 
the world community cannot give the SIDS land that has been so polluted or 
otherwise degraded that it cannot be safely inhabited. Between these two 
extreme examples, difficult issues must be solved before such a relocation 
program can be implemented. 
How much land must be given to a relocated SIDS? Clearly, the SIDS 
must be given enough land to accommodate its population, but how much 
land is that? Dhaka, Bangladesh, has a population density of nearly 118,000 
people per square mile.162 At that density rate, the Maldives would only 
need about 3.5 square miles of land. At the same time, the Maldives has 
four-fifths the population of Wyoming, which is nearly 98,000 square 
miles.163 While neither of these two extremes provides the answer, they 
both demonstrate the difficulty of the problem. Is it fair to give a SIDS just 
enough land to support their current population? Or should a relocated SIDS 
be given enough land to expand? 
These questions can be partially answered by ascertaining whether the 
land given would already contain necessary infrastructure. If a portion of an 
already-built city is provided to the SIDS, less land would be necessary to 
support a population. However, if open terrain is given to a SIDS, more 
land will be necessary. Another relevant consideration is the population 
growth. The Maldives currently has a negative population growth of 0.168 
percent.164 Should the amount of land given to a SIDS, like the Maldives, be 
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based on an assumption that the population will continue to shrink or should 
sufficient land be given to allow reasonable growth? 
Second, what type of land should be given to the relocated SIDS? Many 
SIDS populations are accustomed to surviving in tropical environments. 
Based on this, is it acceptable to give them a parcel of mountainous terrain 
in a northern-latitude county—a terrain in which they have no experience 
living? Also, what natural resources should the land possess? Most SIDS 
themselves have few natural resources. Does this fact justify giving the 
relocated SIDS marginal lands? The character of the land given (i.e., land 
with or without infrastructure) will likely assist in answering this question. 
If the land has no infrastructure, the land will need more natural resources 
to allow the relocated SIDS to build their new nation. Fewer natural 
resources would be necessary if the land already has infrastructure. 
These types of questions have never been dealt with before and do not 
have one correct answer. The difficulty of trying to develop a global climate 
change legal regime demonstrates that answering any one of these questions 
will be extremely difficult, if not impossible. Perhaps the most interesting 
issue raised by these questions is whether the world community is 
comfortable in making these types of decisions. The parties that make the 
decisions about where a SIDS will relocate, what land they get, how rich in 
natural resources the land is, etc., will effectively be deciding the future for 
SIDS. Providing the relocated SIDS with a large portion of resource-rich 
land will provide it with the opportunity to develop and prosper. In contrast, 
providing it just enough marginal land to continue its existence would mean 
that a SIDS, already plagued by poverty, will continue to be one of the 
poorest nations in the world, just in a new location. In a relocation 
adaptation strategy, these decision makers are essentially deciding the fate 
of SIDS. 
The Endangered Species Act165 (ESA) suggests, by analogy, that some 
lawmakers would be comfortable making such decisions about the 
continued existence and viability of SIDS. The ESA Amendments of 1978 
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created the Endangered Species Committee,166 colloquially known as the 
“god squad.” The god squad is authorized to exempt a federal agency from 
compliance with the ESA’s strict provisions.167 Therefore, in the right 
circumstances, the ESA effectively gives the god squad the ability to decide 
on the continued existence of an endangered species. The existence of the 
god squad shows that some are comfortable making decisions fraught with 
moral and philosophical dilemmas. While the dilemmas facing the god 
squad are not completely analogous to the type of dilemmas facing the 
decision-making body that would determine the future viability of SIDS, the 
mere existence of the “god squad” suggests that some would be comfortable 
making such fundamental decisions about the continued existence of a 
nation. 
C. Comparison of the Global Immigration and Relocation Adaptation 
Strategies 
Both adaptation strategies, the global immigration strategy and the 
relocation strategy, have advantages and disadvantages. Similarly, both 
create significant problems that could prove insurmountable. 
The global immigration strategy could prove to be a very useful strategy. 
Most importantly, immigration would provide climate change refugees a 
place to go. It would also allow families to stay together and large portions 
of the populations to immigrate together, ensuring unique cultural practices 
have the potential to survive. 
However, this strategy also poses some significant challenges. First, the 
global immigration strategy would require a global commitment to 
providing a home for all the climate refugees. Any global commitment of 
this size will be difficult to agree upon. In addition to the international 
political difficulties, domestic politics will pose a significant problem. For 
this program to work, developed countries will have to accept not only 
“fault” for climate change but also large amounts of immigrants. While the 
science of climate change is forcing developed countries to accept “fault,” it 
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will likely be very difficult to convince domestic constituencies that the 
country must accept an influx of people from some of the poorest nations on 
earth. If these political hurdles can be overcome, there will likely be 
economic benefits for those countries accepting immigrants in the form of a 
larger labor force and tax base. 
Alternatively, the global relocation strategy will prove significantly more 
difficult to implement. While it would assure placement for inhabitants of 
SIDS that are no longer habitable and would keep families and cultures 
together, its implementation is virtually impossible. This strategy suffers the 
same difficulties as the global immigration strategy: the international 
community would have to agree to implement this strategy, which could 
prove very difficult. Also, developed nations would have to accept fault and 
give up sovereign territory. While the developed world may accept fault, it 
is unlikely that a country would willingly cede sovereign territory. Even if a 
country agreed to give up territory, there are numerous issues concerning 
how the relocated nation would live and develop. While the relocation 
adaptation strategy would better assure that families are kept together, 
cultural practices are preserved, and SIDS remain sovereign, the strategy 
will likely never be implemented. Therefore, the international community 
should focus its efforts on developing a global immigration strategy 
assisting SIDS that will soon be uninhabitable due to the effects of climate 
change, such as the rising sea level. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The science is clear that increased global temperatures are causing sea 
levels to rise and that these rising sea levels threaten the existence of low-
lying nations. Despite realizing this certainty, many countries and 
international organizations appear content to delay dealing with the issue. 
Regardless of SIDS’ attempts to bring awareness to the issue, garner 
support, and force action, this delay persists. 
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The time has come for the world community to seriously address the 
problem of sinking nations. The failure of political will at COP 15 cannot 
continue in future climate change negotiations. Agreements to agree in the 
future are no longer sufficient. The world community must completely 
understand and accept that economic growth based on rapid exploitation of 
fossil fuels (which has been the modus operandi for centuries) will lead to 
the complete destruction of sovereign nations within centuries. Rather than 
ignoring the problem or putting complete blind faith in the rapid 
development of a massive technological solution, the international 
community must seriously consider the development and implementation of 
large-scale adaptation strategies like those discussed in this article. 
This sobering discussion of how to ensure that the populations of 
subsumed nations do not become climate refugees living in tents for 
decades—exactly what President Nasheed of the Maldives wants to avoid—
must begin in earnest today. The complexity of the issue of how to adapt 
entire nations to climate change will take time and effort. The UN should 
make it a priority to develop this discussion at the 2010 COP 16 in Cancun, 
Mexico, at the 2011 COP 17 in South Africa, and at the 2012 COP 18, 
which will be held in either Qatar or South Korea.168 Furthermore, the UN 
should seriously consider convening a special large-scale climate change 
adaptation conference for nations that are facing destruction from rising sea 
levels. While development and implementation of large-scale climate 
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